

1 **FULLY SECURE MESSAGE TRANSMISSION OVER NON-SECURE**
2 **CHANNELS WITHOUT CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY EXCHANGE**

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4

5 **BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION**

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7 1. Field of the Invention

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9 The present invention relates generally to cryptography and, more particularly, to the
10 secure transmission of messages between parties using non-secure communication
11 channels.

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13 2. Description of the Prior Art

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15 Cryptographic systems are widely used to ensure the privacy of messages communicated
16 over insecure channels. Such systems prevent the extraction of information by
17 unauthorized parties from messages transmitted over insecure channels, thus assuring the
18 sender that a transmitted message is being read only by the intended recipient.

19

20 Two distinct classes of cryptographic methods and protocols are widely used, symmetric-
21 key cryptography and public-key cryptography. In symmetric-key techniques, the same
22 key and cryptographic method are used by both the encoding party for sending the
23 message and by the receiving party for decoding the message. The security of

1 symmetric-key protocols is based on the secrecy of the required key and the strength of
2 the cryptographic method. The message can be properly decoded by the receiving party
3 only if the transmitting party and the receiving party possess the identical key used for
4 encoding the message.

5

6 For conventional public-key key techniques such as those pioneered by Diffie and
7 Hellman, there are two keys, a public key to which anyone can gain access and with
8 which a plaintext message is encrypted, and a private key that only the recipient
9 possesses and with which the encrypted message is decrypted. The security of public key
10 protocols relies on the considerable difficulty of determining the private key by analyzing
11 the public key. Such computational difficulty is essentially inherent in most public key
12 processes making them considerably slower than symmetric-key protocols even for the
13 recipient who possesses the private key. Chang has devised protocols for the exchange
14 (or simultaneous creation) of cryptographic keys similar to the broadcast-and-response
15 processes of public-key techniques. These key exchange techniques appear to be fully
16 secure but simply create cryptographic keys for subsequent use by other cryptographic
17 systems; they do not allow for the direct transmission of agent-created messages.

18

19 Mechanical systems exist which are analogous to symmetric-key and public-key systems.
20 For the symmetrical-key process, the mechanical analogy is a locked box carried between
21 the two parties where each party has previously obtained a copy of the key that opens the
22 box. The first, transmitting party unlocks and opens the box, places the message inside,
23 relocks the box and sends it to the second, receiving party who then unlocks the box and

1 removes the message. The public-key process resembles an unlocked box and open lock
2 with a special locking-only key left in a public place. The locking-only key is available
3 for public inspection and analysis. Any interested, transmitting party may place a
4 message in the box, close the lock, and secure the lock with the locking-only key; only
5 the box's recipient owner will be able to unlock the lock with a different unlocking-only
6 key, open the box, and remove the message.

7

8 A third mechanical analogy demonstrates the processes of the claimed invention. In it, a
9 first party places a message in a box, locks it, and sends it to the intended recipient. The
10 recipient places a second lock on the box and returns it to the original sender. The first
11 party then removes the first lock from the doubly locked box and sends the still singly
12 locked box to the intended recipient a final time. The recipient then removes the second
13 lock, opens the box, and retrieves the message. This is the essence of the so-called three-
14 pass protocol. Neither party shares a key to the box, differentiating this process from the
15 symmetric-key process, and the keys to the box are never available for public inspection
16 and analysis, differentiating this process from the public-key processes. This three-pass
17 protocol as utilized in the claimed invention represents a third distinct class of encryption
18 techniques that could best be described as independent-key processes, since neither party
19 possesses nor shares a key with the other party.

20

21 In the context of modern cryptography, Schneier describes the three-pass process as a
22 public-key system and attributes the protocol to Shamir. A primary limitation of the
23 three-pass protocol has been the ability of an eavesdropping third party to use the three

1 transmitted encrypted messages to “crack the code” and derive the original plaintext
2 message. Schneier demonstrates that even otherwise secure symmetric key protocols
3 such as one-time pads are not secure in a three-pass process. Shamir (concurrently with
4 Omura) devised an encryption algorithm for the three-pass protocol using an RSA-like
5 factoring algorithm as the key mechanism. Others have used the three-pass protocol as
6 well; for example, Massey devised a key mechanism based on $GF(2^m)$ finite fields. Both
7 implementations use key processes that are computationally difficult – like conventional
8 public-key methods – but not fully secure.

9

10 The claimed invention uses the three-pass protocol and creates cryptographic processes
11 that are fully secure while requiring no cryptographic key exchange. The processes of
12 the invention are differentiated from the previous, public-key-like, three-pass protocols.
13 The technique of the invention is designated as an independent-key process.

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15

16 SUMMARY AND OBJECTS OF THE INVENTION

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18 One object of the invention is to provide a fully secure cryptographic technique for
19 maintaining privacy of messages conveyed or transmitted over non-secure channels while
20 requiring no exchange of any cryptographic keys, either public or private.

21

1 Accordingly, it is another object of this invention to allow two parties to the
2 communication of a message to exchange the message privately even though another
3 party (an eavesdropper) intercepts all of their communications.

4

5 Another object of this invention is to provide for the fully secure exchange of messages –
6 including cryptographic keys – between two parties even when the communication is
7 transmitted over non-secure channels.

8

9 Another object of this invention is to provide for a message exchange protocol that is
10 fully secure against all but a brute force cryptanalysis attack.

11

12 Another object of this invention is to provide for a fully secure message exchange
13 protocol that is faster than most, if not all, present protocols that do not require each party
14 to share identical encryption/decryption keys.

15

16 Briefly, for two parties desiring the private communication of a plaintext message (P) –
17 the first, transmitting party (T) and the second, receiving party (R) – three encrypted
18 messages (C_1 , C_2 , and C_3) are created and communicated between the parties to generate
19 the fully secure transmission of the initial message P.

20

21 The first party T chooses two distinct transformation processes (α and β) and key
22 elements for those processes with characteristics such that the plaintext message P may
23 be embodied in the output of the transformation process α , the transformation process β

1 can be readily reversed, and the composite transformation of the operation of the
2 transformation process β on the output of the process α embodying message P cannot be
3 reversed. The first encrypted message C_1 is created as the output of the operation of the
4 transformation process β on the output of the process α embodying P and is transmitted
5 by the first party T over a non-secure channel to the second party R .

6 The steps taken by the first party T in creating the first encrypted message C_1 are
7 represented as follows:

8

9	$\alpha(P)$	The result of the transformation α embodies P
10	β' exists	The transformation β can be reversed where β' represents the reverse transformation of β
11		
12	$\beta(\alpha(P))'$ does not exist	The composite process of the transformation β acted on the transformation α can not be reversed
13		
14	$C_1 \leftarrow \beta(\alpha(P))$	The encrypted message C_1 is assigned the composite result of the transformation β acted on the transformation α
15		
16		
17		
18	Reversal of a transformation is taken to mean that given the specific characteristics of the 19 transformation and a specific output of that transformation, the corresponding inputs to 20 the transformation can be derived. Transformations that cannot be reversed are those for 21 which even when given the specific characteristics of the transformation and a specific 22 output of that transformation, the corresponding inputs to the transformation cannot be 23 derived. For the purpose of the invention, transformations may include but are not	

1 limited to mathematical functions and their equivalents. For transformations consisting
2 of mathematical functions, the process of reversing the transformations is known as
3 inverting the functions. In general, the transformations referenced herein may exhibit a
4 more limited or more expansive set of properties than those distinctly attributed to
5 mathematical functions.

6

7 Upon receipt of the first encrypted message C_1 , the second party R chooses a distinct
8 transformation processes (γ) and key elements for that process with characteristics such
9 that the transformation process γ can be readily reversed and the composite
10 transformation of the operation of the transformation process γ on the received encrypted
11 message C_1 cannot be reversed. The second encrypted message C_2 is created as the
12 output of the operation of the transformation process γ on the received encrypted message
13 C_1 and is transmitted by the second party R over a non-secure channel back to the first
14 party T. The steps taken by the second party R in creating the second encrypted message
15 C_2 are represented as follows:

16	γ' exists	The transformation γ can be reversed where γ'
17		represents the reverse transformation of γ

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2 Upon receipt of the second encrypted message C_2 , the first party T reverses the second of
3 the first two transformation processes β using the reversal process that is known to exist
4 according to the initial choice of that transformation. The third and final encrypted
5 message C_3 is created as the output of the operation of the reverse transformation process
6 β' on the received encrypted message C_2 and is transmitted by the first party T over a
7 non-secure channel back to the second party R. The steps taken by the first party T in
8 creating the third encrypted message C_3 are represented as follows:

9

10 $C_3 \leftarrow \beta' (C_2)$ The encrypted message C_3 is assigned the
11 composite result of the reverse transformation
12 β' acted on the second encrypted message C_2

13

14 Following the reversal transformation β' , the third encrypted message C_3 represents the
15 composite output of the operation of the transformation process γ on the output of the
16 process α embodying message P.

17

18 A key characteristic of the transformation processes β and γ for the protocol is the
19 requirement of viable reverse transformations that are independent of the order of the
20 reversal operations. That is, the composite result of the second encrypted message C_2 is
21 the culmination of all three transformation processes α , β , and γ , and it must be the case
22 that the transformations β and γ can be reversed and applied to C_2 – in any order – to
23 yield the sole result of the first transformation α alone. For mathematical functions, this

1 condition is essentially equivalent to the commutative property. This key characteristic
2 allows the operation of β on α in creating C_1 to be reversed as β' in the creation of C_3
3 even though the intervening transformation of γ has been applied. The invention
4 identifies and applies transformations that make such order-independent reversal
5 possible.

6

7 Another constraint of the choice of the transformation process γ is that the composite
8 transformation that is the result of the operation of the transformation process γ remaining
9 in the output C_3 after the reversal of β has been applied to C_2 cannot be reversed.

10

11 Upon receipt of the third encrypted message C_3 , the second party R reverses the
12 transformation processes γ using the reversal process that is known to exist according to
13 the initial choice of that transformation. Following that reverse transformation, the result
14 is simply the output of the process α embodying message P. That is,

15

16 $\alpha(P) \Leftarrow \gamma'(C_3)$,

17

18 except that this copy of $\alpha(P)$ is now in the possession of the second party R rather than in
19 that of the initial party T. The second party R removes the plaintext message P from its
20 embodiment in the output of the transformation process α to yield possession of the
21 original message created by T. The invention identifies and applies means of embodying
22 the message P in the output of transformation process α in a manner such that the second
23 party R can remove the message P from that embodiment.

1

2 The processes of the invention are distinctly different from previous implementations of
3 three-pass protocols that used complex, public-key-like computational methods to
4 implement the encryption components of each pass. The processes of the invention are
5 straightforward transformation methods that are fully secure and yet computationally
6 efficient. Because the invention doesn't require either party to possess or gain any
7 information about the other's primary encryption process, the technique of the invention
8 is designated as an independent-key process.

9

10 An advantage of the present invention is that it is technically impossible for an
11 eavesdropper, even knowing the transmitted quantities C_1 , C_2 , and C_3 and the general
12 properties and processes of the transformations α , β , and γ , to directly determine the
13 plaintext message P because no reverse transformations can be applied to the transmitted
14 quantities to make that determination.

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16

17 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

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19 Figure 1 is a block diagram depicting a cryptographic system that may be employed for
20 fully secure transmission of a message over non-secure channels without the prior
21 exchange of cryptographic keys, according to the invention claimed herein.

22

1 Figure 2 is a block diagram depicting a general example of a possible embodiment of
2 such a cryptographic system that may be employed for fully secure transmission of a
3 message over non-secure channels without the prior exchange of cryptographic keys,
4 according to the invention claimed herein.

5

6 Figure 3 is a block diagram depicting a specific example of a possible embodiment of
7 such a cryptographic system that may be employed for fully secure transmission of a
8 message over non-secure channels without the prior exchange of cryptographic keys,
9 according to the invention claimed herein.

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12 DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

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14 Referring to FIG. 1, a cryptographic system is shown in which all communication takes
15 place over a non-secure channel 21. The non-secure channel 21 may include a telephone
16 line, a radio connection, a cellular telephone connection, a fiber optic line, a microwave
17 connection, a coaxial line, an infrared optical link, or any other communication
18 technology that permits the transmission of information from a first location to a second
19 location. Two-way communication is exchanged on the non-secure channel 21 between
20 the initial converser 11 referred to as the transmitting party T and the second converser
21 31 referred to as the receiving party R using transceivers 22 and 23, for example digital
22 cellular telephones, modems, or any other mechanism for converting information into the
23 structure necessary for transmission by the non-secure channel 21. The transmitting

1 party 11 possesses a plaintext message P 10 to be communicated to the receiving party
2 31.

3

4 Both the transmitting party T 11 and the receiving party R 31 use cryptographic devices
5 12 and 32 respectively, for encrypting and decrypting information under the action of the
6 processes of this invention. Each cryptographic device 12 and 32 receives the output of
7 transformation generators 13 and 33 respectively. The first transformation generator 13
8 creates the transformations α 14, β 15 and β' 16 which are provided to the cryptographic
9 device 12. The transformation β' 16 is the reverse transformation or inversion of process
10 β 15. The second transformation generator 33 creates the transformations γ 34 and γ' 35
11 which are provided to the cryptographic device 32. The transformation γ' 35 is the
12 reverse transformation of γ 34.

13

14 The transmitting party T's 11 cryptographic device 12 encrypts the plaintext message P10
15 into the first cryptographic message C_1 24 by transforming message P 10 through the
16 transformations α 14 and β 15 so that no reverse transformation is possible for the
17 resulting output C_1 24. The first cryptographic message C_1 24 is then transmitted through
18 the first transceiver 22, over the non-secure channel 21, and through the second
19 transceiver 23 to the receiving party R 31.

20

21 The receiving party R's 31 cryptographic device 32 further encrypts the received first
22 cryptographic message C_1 24 into the second cryptographic message C_2 25 by
23 transforming C_1 24 through the transformation γ 34 so that no reverse transformation is

1 possible for the resulting output C_2 25. The second cryptographic message C_2 25 is then
2 transmitted through the second transceiver 23, back over the non-secure channel 21, and
3 through the first transceiver 22 to the transmitting party T 11.

4

5 The transmitting party T's 11 cryptographic device 12 partially decrypts the received
6 second cryptographic message C_2 25 into the third cryptographic message C_3 26 by
7 transforming C_2 25 through the reverse transformation β' 16 so that no reverse
8 transformation is possible for the resulting output C_3 26. The third cryptographic
9 message C_3 26 is then transmitted through the first transceiver 22, over the non-secure
10 channel 21, and through the second transceiver 23 to the receiving party R 31.

11

12 The receiving party R's 31 cryptographic device 32 device further decrypts the received
13 third cryptographic message C_3 26 by transforming C_3 26 through the reverse
14 transformation γ' 35. The result now in the possession of the receiving party R 31 is the
15 output of the process α 14 embodying P 10. The receiving party R 31 removes the
16 plaintext message P 10 from its embodiment in the output of the transformation process α
17 14 to yield possession of the original message created by T 11. The receiving party R 31
18 does not know nor need to know the transmitting party T's 11 transformation process β
19 15 nor does the transmitting party T 11 know nor need to know the receiving party R's 31
20 transformation process γ 34. Both T 11 and R 31 know and utilize the transformation
21 process α 14, but α 14 can be publicly known or transmitted from T 11 to R 31 without
22 fear of interception, since the message P 10 cannot be decoded by an eavesdropper 41
23 who knows only transformation process α 14. Because the invention doesn't require

1 either party to possess or gain any information about the other's primary encryption
2 processes, the technique of the invention is designated as an independent-key process.

3

4 The cryptographic system of the invention includes a non-secure communications
5 channel 21, making it possible for an eavesdropper 41 that is not included in the
6 cryptographic system to receive all of the communications between the transmitting party
7 T 11 and the receiving party R 31. The eavesdropper 41 may possess a cryptographic
8 device 42 that includes the same processing capabilities and knowledge of the
9 transformation processes as the cryptographic devices 12 and 32 available to the
10 transmitting party T 11 and the receiving party R 31, and a transformation generator 43
11 that includes the same capabilities and available transformation processes as the
12 transformation generators 13 and 33 available to the transmitting party T 11 and the
13 receiving party R 31. However, even given the full content of the encrypted messages C₁
14 24, C₂ 25, and C₃ 26, the eavesdropper 41 cannot directly determine or otherwise deduce
15 the transformations α 14, β 15, or γ 34 to determine the original plaintext message P 10.
16 The best that the eavesdropper 41 can do with the information from the messages C₁ 24,
17 C₂ 25, and C₃ 26 is to establish some limited relationships between some of the
18 components of the messages. However, knowledge of those relationships alone is not
19 very informative or substantially useful to the eavesdropper 41 since the eavesdropper 41
20 would still have to guess the values of many specific components of the transformations.
21 Refining that relationship information would require an amount of effort by the
22 eavesdropper 41 no less than that required for a brute-force break of the cryptographic

1 system. Therefore, the cryptographic system is fully secure, being no more susceptible to
2 cryptanalytic attack than to a brute-force attack.

3

4 As merely a general example of a possible embodiment of the processes of this invention,
5 the basic techniques of matrix algebra may be applied to create transformations that
6 satisfy the requirements of the invention. This example is demonstrated in FIG. 2. As
7 shown in FIG. 2, the transmitting party T 11 has a plaintext message P 10 to be
8 transmitted over a non-secure channel 21 to the receiving party R 31. The transmitting
9 party T 11 uses a transformation generator 13 to generate two transformations α 14 and β
10 15 such that β 15 can be reversed, but the combined transformation $(\alpha$ 14) (β 15) cannot
11 be reversed. The transformation α 14 for this example is the creation of a singular (i.e.,
12 non-invertible) matrix [A] 14 where the plaintext message P 10 is embodied in the upper
13 left block of the matrix and the remaining three blocks of the matrix are established by
14 the transformation process to be random or quasi-random elements which exhibit
15 characteristics such that the matrix [A] 14 cannot be inverted. The second transformation
16 β 15 is taken to be that of post-multiplying the matrix [A] 14 by an invertible matrix [B]
17 15 composed of random or quasi-random elements to create the first encrypted message
18 [AB] 24. The first encrypted message [AB] 24 which is created by the cryptographic
19 device 12 is singular or non-invertible because one of its key components – [A] 14
20 (which embodies P 10) – is singular. The transmitting party T 11 transmits the matrix of
21 elements in [AB] 24 to the receiving party R 31 over a non-secure channel 21. Upon
22 receipt of [AB] 24, the receiving party R 31 uses the transformation generator 33 to
23 generate the transformation γ 34 such that γ 34 can be reversed. For this example, the

1 transformation γ 34 is taken to be the process of pre-multiplying the matrix [AB] 24 by
2 an invertible matrix [C] 34 composed of random or quasi-random elements. Once the
3 cryptographic device 32 is used to apply the transformation γ 34 to matrix [AB] 24, the
4 resulting second encrypted message [CAB] 25 is also singular or non-invertible because
5 [A] 14, a key component of that result, is singular. The receiving party R 31 transmits
6 the matrix of elements in [CAB] 25 to the transmitting party T 11 over a non-secure
7 channel 21. Upon receipt of [CAB] 25, the transmitting party T further transforms
8 [CAB] 25 by post-multiplying the matrix [CAB] 25 by the inverse of the matrix [B] 15,
9 which is $[B]^{-1}$ 16. That post-multiplication effectively reverses the transformation β that
10 was the process of post-multiplying [A] 14 by [B] 15. The resulting third encrypted
11 message [CA] 26 is also singular or non-invertible because [A] 14 is still a component of
12 the result and is singular. The transmitting party T 11 transmits the matrix of elements in
13 [CA] 26 to the receiving party R 31 over a non-secure channel 21. Upon receipt of [CA]
14 26, the receiving party R 31 further transforms [CA] 26 by pre-multiplying the matrix
15 [CA] 26 by the inverse of the matrix [C] 34, which is $[C]^{-1}$ 35. That pre-multiplication
16 effectively reverses the transformation γ 34 that was the process of pre-multiplying [AB]
17 24 by [C] 34. The final result of these combined transformations (implemented in this
18 example as matrix multiplications) is the matrix [A] 14, which embodies the plaintext
19 message P 10 in its upper left block. That result is now in the possession of the receiving
20 party R 31. The receiving party R 31 does not know nor need to know the transmitting
21 party T's 11 transformation matrix [B] 15 nor does the transmitting party T 11 know nor
22 need to know the receiving party R's 31 transformation matrix [C] 34. Because the
23 invention doesn't require either party to possess or gain any information about the other's

1 primary encryption processes, the technique of the invention is designated as an
2 independent-key process.

3

4 A specific example of an embodiment of the processes of this invention using the basic
5 techniques of matrix algebra is shown in FIG. 3. As shown in FIG. 3, the transmitting
6 party T 11 has a plaintext message P 10 of the phrase "HI" to be transmitted over a non-
7 secure channel 21 to the receiving party R 31. The phrase "HI" is converted to a numeric
8 equivalent of "8, 9" using the conversion of "A" to "1", "B" to "2", etc. Other numeric
9 conversions of characters, such as for the standard ASCII character set, could be used.

10 The transmitting party T 11 generates two transformations α 14 and β 15 such that β 15
11 can be reversed, but the combined transformation $(\alpha$ 14) (β 15) cannot be reversed. The
12 transformation α 14 for this example is taken to be the creation of a singular (i.e., non-
13 invertible) matrix [A] 14 where the plaintext message P 10 is embodied in the upper left
14 area of the matrix and the remaining elements of the matrix are established by the
15 transformation process to be random or quasi-random elements which exhibit
16 characteristics such that the matrix [A] 14 cannot be inverted. The numeric equivalent
17 "8, 9" of the message "HI" is loaded in the upper left block of [A] 14 and the remaining
18 elements are chosen for this example to be "7, 5, 6, 3, 1, 0, 5" so that [A] 14 is non-
19 invertible. Thus, the transformation α 14 in this example converts the message "HI" to
20 the non-invertible matrix [A] 14. The second transformation β 15 is taken to be that of
21 post-multiplying the matrix [A] 14 by an invertible matrix [B] 15 composed of random or
22 quasi-random elements to create the first encrypted message [AB] 24. The matrix [B] 15
23 is chosen for this example to contain the elements "3, 4, 6, 2, 1, 1, 5, 8, 4" so the

1 transformation β 15 yields the resulting elements of $[AB]$ 24 as “77, 97, 85, 42, 50, 48,
2 28, 44, 26”. This first encrypted message $[AB]$ 24 is singular or non-invertible. The
3 transmitting party T 11 transmits the matrix of elements in $[AB]$ 24 to the receiving party
4 R 31 over a non-secure channel 21. Upon receipt of $[AB]$ 24, the receiving party R 31
5 generates the transformation γ 34 such that γ 34 can be reversed. For this example, the
6 transformation γ 34 is taken to be the process of pre-multiplying the matrix $[AB]$ 24 by
7 an invertible matrix $[C]$ 34 composed of random or quasi-random elements. The matrix
8 $[C]$ 34 is chosen for this example to contain the elements “5, 7, 1, 2, 3, 6, 4, 9, 0” so the
9 transformation γ 34 yields the resulting elements of $[CAB]$ 25 as “707, 879, 787, 448,
10 608, 470, 686, 838, 772”. The resulting second encrypted message $[CAB]$ 25 also is
11 singular. The receiving party R 31 transmits the matrix of elements in $[CAB]$ 25 to the
12 transmitting party T 11 over a non-secure channel 21. Upon receipt of $[CAB]$ 25, the
13 transmitting party T further transforms $[CAB]$ 25 by post-multiplying the matrix $[CAB]$
14 25 by the inverse of the matrix $[B]$ 15, which is $[B]^{-1}$ 16. That post-multiplication
15 effectively reverses the transformation β that was the process of post-multiplying $[A]$ 14
16 by $[B]$ 15. The resulting third encrypted message $[CA]$ 26 contains the elements “76, 87,
17 61, 37, 36, 53, 77, 90, 55” and also is singular or non-invertible because $[A]$ 14 is still a
18 component of the result and is singular. The transmitting party T 11 transmits the matrix
19 of elements in $[CA]$ 26 to the receiving party R 31 over a non-secure channel 21. Upon
20 receipt of $[CA]$ 26, the receiving party R 31 further transforms $[CA]$ 26 by pre-
21 multiplying the matrix $[CA]$ 26 by the inverse of the matrix $[C]$ 34, which is $[C]^{-1}$ 35.
22 That pre-multiplication effectively reverses the transformation γ 34 that was the process
23 of pre-multiplying $[AB]$ 24 by $[C]$ 34. The final result of these combined transformations

1 (implemented in this example as matrix multiplication) is the original matrix [A] 14 with
2 the elements “8, 9, 7, 5, 6, 3, 1, 0, 5”, which embodies the plaintext message P 10 entered
3 as “8, 9” in its upper left block. That result is now in the possession of the receiving
4 party R 31. The receiving party R 31 does not know nor need to know the transmitting
5 party T’s 11 transformation matrix [B] 15 nor does the transmitting party T 11 know nor
6 need to know the receiving party R’s 31 transformation matrix [C] 34 in order for the
7 plaintext message P 10 to be securely transmitted between the two.

8

9 The elements of the transformation matrices [B] 15 and [C] 34 and the non-message
10 elements of the matrix [A] 14 can be considered “key” elements and in conjunction with
11 the transformation processes could be labeled the “keys” to the cryptographic system of
12 this invention.

13

14 Because the cryptographic system of the invention includes a non-secure communications
15 channel 21, an eavesdropper 41 that is not included in the cryptographic system may
16 receive all of the communications between the transmitting party T 11 and the receiving
17 party R 31. The eavesdropper 41 may possess a cryptographic device 42 that includes the
18 same processing capabilities (matrix multiplication in the case of this example) and
19 knowledge of the transformation processes (matrix operations in the case of this example)
20 as the cryptographic devices 12 and 32 available to the transmitting party T 11 and the
21 receiving party R 31, and a transformation generator 43 that includes the same
22 capabilities and available transformation processes (matrix operations in the case of this
23 example) as the transformation generators 13 and 33 available to the transmitting party T

1 11 and the receiving party R 31. However, even given the full content of the encrypted
2 messages [AB] 24, [CAB] 25, and [CA] 26, the eavesdropper 41 cannot directly
3 determine or otherwise deduce the matrices [A] 14, [B] 15, or [C] 34 to determine the
4 original plaintext message P 10 because the observed matrices [AB] 24, [CAB] 25, and
5 [CA] 26 are not invertible. The best that the eavesdropper 41 can do with the information
6 from the messages [AB] 24, [CAB] 25, and [CA] 26 is to establish some limited linear
7 relationships between some of the elements of the message matrices. However,
8 knowledge of those linear relationships alone is not very informative or substantially
9 useful to the eavesdropper 41 since the eavesdropper 41 would still have to guess the
10 values of many specific elements in the matrices. Refining that linear relationship
11 information would require an amount of effort by the eavesdropper 41 no less than that
12 required for a brute-force break of the cryptographic system. Therefore, the
13 cryptographic system is fully secure, being no more susceptible to cryptanalytic attack
14 than to a brute-force attack.

15
16 The precise encrypted messages transmitted 24, 25, 26 between transmitting party T 11
17 and the receiving party R 31 depend on the plaintext message P 10 and the transformation
18 processes 14, 15, 34. The options for choices of the transformation processes 14, 15, 34
19 make possible nearly any observable combination of encrypted messages 24, 25, 26
20 regardless of the initial plaintext message P 10. The magnitude of the alternatives for
21 observable combinations of encrypted messages is so large as to frustrate any attempt by
22 an eavesdropper 41 to develop cryptanalytic approaches to attack the cryptographic
23 system.

1

2 Although the present invention has been described in terms of the presently preferred
3 embodiment, it is to be understood that such disclosure is purely illustrative and is not to
4 be interpreted as limiting. Consequently, without departing from the spirit and scope of
5 the invention, various alterations, modifications, and/or alternative applications of the
6 invention will, no doubt, be suggested to those skilled in the art after having read the
7 preceding disclosure. Accordingly, it is intended that the following claims be interpreted
8 as encompassing all alterations, modifications, or alternative applications as fall within
9 the true spirit and scope of the invention.

10